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Abstract
This paper explores optimal incentive schemes in public health institutions when
agents (doctors) are intrinsically motivated. We develop a principal-agent dynamic
model with moral hazard in which agents’ intrinsic motivation could be promoted
(crowding-in) by combining monetary and non-monetary rewards, but could also be
discouraged (crowding-out) when the health manager uses only monetary incentives.
We discuss the conditions under which investing in doctors’ motivational capital by
the use of well designed nonmonetary rewards is optimal for the health organizations
manager. Our results show that such investments will be more efficient than pure
monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove that when doctors are risk-
averse, it is profitable for the health manager to invest in motivational capital.
Keywords: contracts, moral hazard, intrinsic motivation, crowding effects, motivational capital.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this work is to investigate the roles played by the intrinsic motivation
of doctors working in public health systems and by crowding effects, which can either
undermine or enhance these inner motivations. Should health care organisations invest
in motivating doctors? How should organisations’ managers design incentive schemes so
that they can benefit from what Akerlof and Kranton [1] call motivational capital? Could
intrinsic motivation be the key to avoiding opportunistic behaviour?
People who work in the provision of collective goods are usually intrinsically motivated
agents who get satisfaction from the very act of doing their work. There are motives such
as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic pleasure in helping others and ethical commitments, that
induce people to help others more than would an own-material-maximizing individual [7].
Teachers, doctors, firefighters, policemen and social workers are good examples of such
intrinsically motivated workers [2, 4, 20]. We use the term “intrinsic motivation” to refer
to doing something because it is inherently interesting or enjoyable [10, 11]. In health
care, intrinsic motivation refers to doctors’ willingness to exert effort performing in medical
activities that are of non-material interest like research, teaching, further education, health
prevention activities or clinical management.
A new branch of contract theory investigates optimal contracts and incentives when
agents are intrinsically motivated and when incentives beyond the money work [13, 14, 24,
28]. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole [14] explore the effects of implicit incentives in the form
of career concerns. Murdock [24] shows that in presence of implicit contracts, the firm can
commit to implement some financially non-profitable projects with positive intrinsic value
for the agent because doing that, agents will respond putting high effort to generate more
projects and increasing the expected returns of the firm.
Another body of the literature analyzes the effects of having motivated agents in public
organisations or in private organisations that serve collective goods [4, 16, 17, 27]. Wilson
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[29] explains how in the collective goods provision agencies, incentives are supplemented
with a sense of mission based on a shared organizational culture. In Ghatak and Mueller
[20] organisations can reduce incentive payments when they contract intrinsically motivated
agents. Thus, an organisation that adopts the non-for-profit status will attract motivated
workers and will benefit from paying agents lower efficiency wages. Dewatripont, Jewitt
and Tirole [15] show that specialization and profesionalization of organisations raises the
incentives of agents and create a sense of mission. They point out that “this paradigm can be
fruitfully expanded, for example to a dynamic perspective where effort choices are repeated
and where the evolution of mission design can be analysed (p. 216)”.
The above literature incorporates intrinsic motivation and the importance of the non-
monetary incentives in principal-agent models. However, all these works have neglected
the well established fact that incentives affect intrinsic motivation. Psychologists [8, 9, 10,
12], and behavioural economists [2, 5, 18, 19] argue that under some specific conditions
incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation of agents. The crowding-out effect is one of the
most important anomalies in economics, and it acts in a manner opposite to the fundamental
economic ‘law’ that raising monetary incentives increases supply [2, 3, 5, 7, 19, 22]. Bowles
and Polanía-Reyes [7] classify the mechanisms accounting for crowding out. Our framework
deals with three of these mechanisms: the informative value of incentives about principal’s
intentions or type, the compromise of agents’ self determination or control aversion, and the
agents’ preferences updating process.
However crowding-in also can occur [7, 11]. In sixteen out of the fifty experiments sur-
veyed in Bowles and Polanía-Reyes [7] they found evidence of crowding-in showing that well
designed fines, subsidies, and the like, make incentives and intrinsic motivation complements
rather than substitutes.
This work investigates the principal-agent relationship between managers and doctors
[23], where the divergence in objectives between the principal’s performance measures and
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the physicians’ mission is a source of conflict. It is assumed that principals in health care
are primarily focused on health benefits. They focus heavily upon improving certain health
performance measures that are easily observable by the electorate: for instance reducing
the amount of time spent on waiting lists, increasing the number of operations conducted
for common pathologies, increasing the infrastructure, buying new technology assets, reduc-
ing costs and saving resources, and enlarging the range of services supplied. In contrast,
physicians’ goals are focused toward patients, a subset of all tax-payers, and also they have
other interests in clinical and medical research, teaching and further education that taken
together form what is called the doctors’ “mission”. One key fact of our approach is that
incentives may make the action of providing health a less convincing signal of a doctors’
intrinsic motivation resulting in observers interpreting some generous acts as merely self-
interested. This may crowd out doctors intrinsic motivation and they could shift from an
ethical to a payoff maximizing frame [3, 7].
The contribution of our approach is threefold: first, following Dewatripont, Jewitt and
Tirole [14] research program, we present a dynamical principal-agent model with intrinsically
motivated agents and repeated effort and incentives choices to analyze the evolution of
optimal contracts; second, we incorporate crowding effects in this dynamic model; and third,
the proposed dynamical setting allows us to endogeneize changes in doctors’ preferences in
response to the principal actions and therefore to evaluate how optimal contracts evolve and
affect the outcomes of the game.
In the model, health managers have two options to motivate doctors: motivational
investments and monetary incentives. We use the term motivational investments to refer
to the resources devoted to well designed mechanisms, beyond the monetary incentives,
oriented towards maintaining, recovering or enhancing doctors’ intrinsic motivation through
a crowding-in effect. However, the use of pure monetary incentives may discourage doctors
through a crowding-out effect, leading them to behave as payoff maximizers.
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We discuss the conditions under which spending resources on motivational capital is op-
timal for the health organisation’s manager. Our results show that investing in motivational
capital will be more efficient than monetary incentives in the long run. We will also prove
that when doctors are risk-averse, it is more profitable for the health manager to invest in
motivational capital.
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 shows the
results and section 4 summarizes the work with some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are two players in the game: a doctor A (agent) and a health manager P (principal)1.
We assume thatA is intrinsically motivated. We also restrict the analysis to linear contracts.
The game is played for a finite number of periods t = 0, 1, ..., T, .... There is a health
performance measure qt ∈ R −the number of QALYs for instance− that P wants to max-
imise. For all t let Rt(qt) be a function Rt : R −→ R+ which assigns a monetary value to
every qt2.
Performance qt is a function of doctor’s effort et ∈ {e, e}. Assume that qt ∈ {q, q} in
which q > q. Take q as P ’s target for performance level and q as a failure to reach this target
performance level. Let p(qt = q|et) = θi be the conditional probability of high performance
given A’s effort choice i = 0, 1 in which 0 indicates low effort e and 1 indicates high effort
e. The probability distribution of qt conditioned to et is given by: p(qt = q|et = e) = θ1;
p(qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ1 and, p(qt = q|et = e) = θ0; p(qt = q|et = e) = 1− θ0. We assume
that θ1 > θ0, which indicates that qt is an informative signal of et.
We denote the health expected revenue conditional to qt with E[Rt(qt)|θi]; R and R will
1We use she and he to refer to the agent and the principal respectively, is conventional whithin the
principal agent literature.
2QALY stands for Quality Adjusted Live Years. For an estimation of the monetary value of a QALY see
Pinto-Prades, Loomes and Brey (2009).
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stand for Rt(q) and Rt(q), respectively.
Let wt = w(qt) be the contingent monetary reward offered by P : w(qt) = wt and
w(q
t
) = wt, where wt > wt. E[w(qt)|θi] will then be the expected monetary cost for the
health organization, or P . Let s0 ∈ {0, S} be the total initial investment in motivational
capital. This investment generates a cost stream Ct(s0) that takes the value C0(S) = S
or C0(0) = 0 in t = 0 and gives the depreciation cost Ct(S) = γS for every t > 1 at a
constant depreciation rate of γ ∈ [0, 1). We assume, as in Murdock [24], that by having
motivated doctors, P should expect discounted future profits higher than the current cost
of motivational incentives. P ’s problem is to maximise the expected profit function.
E[pit|θi] = E[Rt(qt)|θi]− E[wt(qt)|θi]− Ct(s0)
We represent A’s preferences with the following overall expected utility function.
E[Ut|θi] = E[ut(wt)|θi]− ψt(et) + φt
(
wt, s0
)
The first term on the right hand side of the above expression ut(wt), representsA’s utility
from monetary incentives which “...complement the remuneration provided by the employer
of the physician (p. 1)”, as in De Pouvourville [26]. We assume that A is risk-averse and
that this utility function from monetary rewards satisfies the Inada conditions3.
The middle term ψt(et) is the cost from effort in utility terms that depends positively
upon effort: ψt(e) = 0 and ψt(e) = Ψ. Thus, ψt(et) ∈ {0,Ψ} where ψt(e) = {Ψ ∈ R|Ψ > 1}.
The last term is φt(wt, s0) ∈ [0,Φ], in which φt : R2+ −→ R+ captures A’s intrinsic
motivation. Intrinsic motivation depends negatively on incentives wt. This captures the
crowding-out effect of incentives. Intrinsic motivation depends positively on P ’s investment
3Inada conditions: dut(wt)/dwt > 0, d2ut(wt)/dw2t < 0, ut(0) = 0, lim
t→∞
[
dut(wt)/dwt
]
= 0 and
lim
t→0
[
dut(wt)/dwt
]
=∞.
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in motivational capital s0.
The incentives offered by P may affect the intrinsic motivation of A through crowding
effects. The properties of this intrinsic motivation function and of crowding effects are
summed up in the following assumptions:
A1: For any fixed value of wt(qt) = w˜t such that w˜t ∈ [0,∞)× [0,∞) we have φt(w˜t, S)−
φt(w˜t, 0) > 0.
A2: Intrinsic motivation depends negatively upon incentives:
∂φt(wt, s0)/∂wt < 0.
A3: Crowding in: in the case that P chooses s0 = S, φt increases over time:
dφt (wt, S) /dt > 0
A4: Crowding out: in case of P chooses s0 = 0, φt decreases over time;
dφt (wt, 0) /dt < 0
Assumption A1 shows a fixed crowding effect. Assumption A2 states that in presence
of intrinsic motivation, agents enjoy a higher reward from it if they perform at high effort
norm. Assumption A3 tells that intrinsic motivation is negatively correlated with incentives
(crowding out). Assumption A4 captures a crowding-in effect: when P chooses the s0 =
S, A’s intrinsic motivation will increase period after period. Assumption A5 captures a
crowding-out effect: when P chooses a s0 = 0, A’s intrinsic motivation will diminish period
after period.
Physicians may have different degrees of intrinsic motivation at t = 0. The model
captures this heterogeneity with a probability distribution function, F0(φ0) that is defined
over the value of the intrinsic motivation at t = 0. For any φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ] the distribution
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function calculates the probability F0(φ∗) = Prob(φ0 6 φ∗). In the game, P knows F0(φ0).
His offer at t = 0 affects A’s intrinsic motivation through crowding effects. We model
crowding effects as time displacements of the distribution function conditional to s0 ∈
{0, S} and wt (for example, Ft(φt|wt, s0)). Thus, for any φt = φ∗ ∈ [0,Φ], the conditional
distribution calculates the probability Ft(φt|wt, s0) = Prob(φt 6 φ∗).
Figure 1 shows how crowding effects affect the intrinsic motivation probability distri-
bution function. At t = 0, P knows a given distribution function F0(φ0). His choice of
incentives in t = 0 affects agents intrinsic motivation switching the distribution function at
t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
Fig. 1: Stochastic Dominance. The figure shows how crowding effects affect
the intrinsic motivation probability distribution function in response to prin-
cipal’s choice of incentive policy: motivational investments s0 = S, or pure
monetary incentives s0 = 0. Motivational investments s0 = S cause crowding-in
switching the distribution function to the right period after period. Pure mone-
tary incentives s0 = 0 cause crowding-out switching the distribution function to
the left period after period. Stochastic dominance ensures that no curve cross
each together
As shown in the figure, if P chooses s0 = 0, then the distribution function will shift to
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the left period after period. In other words, if incentives are only monetary, then doctors
will concentrate around lower values of intrinsic motivation φt = 0. In contrast, if incentives
are motivational s0 = S, then doctors will concentrate around higher values of intrinsic
motivation φt = Φ. In this latter case, the distribution function shifts period after period
to the right in figure 1.
We assume stochastic dominance in distribution function time shifts. This property in-
volves, as shown in figure 1, that P ’s choices of incentives affect every A intrinsic motivation
in the same way. As a result, stochastic dominance assumes that probability distributions
do not intersect on another4.
The game is a repeated dynamic re-contracting game. In each period of the game both
players have to make new choices: P must offer a new contract after updating his beliefs
about A, and A has to choose a new effort level. The choices made by P affect A’s intrinsic
motivation, and changes in A’s motivation affect the contract and equilibrium payments
offered by P in the next period.
Each period of the game consists of three stages: stage 0, stage 1, and stage 2. The
timing of the within-period in each t = 0, 1 . . . , T, . . . is:
(0) The principal P knows the distribution of doctors’ intrinsic motivation F0(φ0) at
t = 0 or updates Ft(φt|s0, wt) given wt and s0 at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . He then offers a contract
to A. This contract consists of a pair of stochastic contingent payments w0(q0) = {w,w}
and the choice to invest or not invest in motivational capital s0: {w(q0), s0} at t = 0 and
{w(qt), s0} at t = 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
(1) A accepts or refuses the contract. If she accepts, then she chooses an action et ∈ {e, e}
at each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . . If she refuses then she gets her reservation utility U .
(2) Finally, output is realised qt ∈ {qt, qt}, payment is realised w(qt) = {wt, wt} and
payoffs pit and Ut are realized in each t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
4For a more formal description of this property, see the mathematical appendix.
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Fig. 2: Timing. The figure describes the stages of the game within each period, differen-
tiating the starting period of the game t = 0, where no crowding effect has had place, from
subsequent periods t = 1, 2, . . . where P ’s actions affects As’ intrinsic motivation through
crowding effects
Figure 2 shows the sequence of these stages in t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . .
Before solving the game, let us assume that P and A can not sign long term contracts
at t = 0. As a result, they have to agree upon the rewards at every period t. Once P has
chosen s0 = S in t = 0 he bears the depreciation cost Ct(s0) = γS. We also assume that
there is no contract renegotiation in the short term. In this game, the only way to agree
upon a contract is to play the repeated game at every period t = 0, 1, . . . , T, . . . as a new
game.
We can therefore write P ’s problem as follows,
Max{wt(qt),s0}αt
(
E[Rt(qt)|θ0]− E[wt(qt)|θ0]
)
+ (1− αt)
(
E[Rt(qt)|θ1]− E[wt(qt)|θ1]
)
− Ct(s0) (1)
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Subject to
E[ut(wt)|θ1)]− ψt(e) + e · φt
(
wt, s0
)
> E[ut(wt)|θ0)]− ψt(e) + e · φt
(
wt, s0
)
(ICC) (2)
E[ut(wt)|θ1)]− ψt(e) + e · φt
(
wt, s0
)
> U (PC) (3)
ut(w) > 0 (LLC) (4)
Where Pt(φt < φ|s0) = αt is the probability of having a doctor with an intrinsic moti-
vation lower than the average conditional to P ’s choice of s0, and Pt(φt > φ|s0) = 1 − αt
is the probability of having a doctor with an intrinsic motivation higher or equal than the
average conditional to P ’s choice of s0. The objective function of P is weighted by αt and
1−αt because P does not know the intrinsic motivation of each A. Therefore, he will offer a
contract sufficient to incentivize the agent with average level of intrinsic motivation. Thus,
those agents who are less intrinsically motivated than the average φt < φt will shirk, and
those who are equal or more intrinsically motivated than the average φt > φt will exert
high effort5. Condition (2) is A’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) and ensures that
the agent will prefer to exert high effort. (3) is the A’s participation constraint (PC) and
ensures that the agent will prefer to participate and accept the contract. Finally, (4) is a
limited liability constraint (LLC) and ensures that the low utility payment will never fall
below zero.
The solution to the above problem for each t is a pair of contingent payments {w,w}
associated with q and q, respectively. Let us show how we calculate the equilibrium of the
game.
For notational simplicity we will write ut(w) = u and ut(w) = u. Let h : u(w) 7−→ w be
the inverse of the utility function h(u(w)) = (u(w))−1 = w; then w = h(u) and w = h(u).
5When crowding-out (crowding-in) effect entirely happens, all agents’ intrinsic motivation will reach
φt = 0 (φt = Φ).Then, all agents will exert high effort because φt = φt = 0 (φt = φt = Φ). As a
consequence P’s benefit function will be EΠt = θ1 · [Rt(qt)−wt(qt)]− (1− θ1) · [Rt(qt)−wt(qt)]−Ct(s0).
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Finally ∆θ = (θ1 − θ0); and reservation utility is denoted by U .
We rewrite P ’s problem as follows:
Max{wt(qt),s0} αt ·
(
θ0
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ0) (R− h(u)))
+ (1− αt) ·
(
θ1
(
R− h(u))− (1− θ1) (R− h(u)))− Ct(s0) (5)
Subject to
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u−Ψ + φt > θ0u+ (1− θ0)u+ φt (ICC) (6)
θ1u+ (1− θ1)u−Ψ + φt > U (PC) (7)
u > 0 (LLC) (8)
Letting λ and µ be the non-negative Khun-Tucker multipliers associated respectively to
(ICC) and (PC) constraints. First-order conditions of this problem lead to:
(
1/u′(w)
)
= µ+ λ · (∆θ/θ1) (9)(
1/u′(w)
)
= µ− λ · (∆θ/(1− θ1)) (10)
The equations (9) and (10) (jointly with (6) and (7)) form a system of four equations
with four variables (w,w, µ, λ). Multiplying (9) by θ1 and (10) by (1− θ1) and adding those
two modified equations, we obtain;
µ =
(
θ1/u
′(w)
)
+
(
1− θ1)/u′(w)
)
> 0 (11)
Therefore, µ > 0 and the participation constraint (9) is binding. Using (11) and (9), we
also obtain,
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λ =
(
(1− θ1) · θ1/∆θ
)
·
((
1/u′(w)
)− (1/u′(w))) > 0 (12)
Therefore, λ > 0 and the incentive compatibility constraint (6) is also binding. Thus,
we can immediately obtain the values of u and u by solving a system with two equations
and two unknowns. The result is shown below:
ut = U − φt (wt, s0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
ut = U − φt (wt, s0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ.
Applying the variable change wt(qt) = h(ut(wt)) = (ut(wt))
−1, we have the following
payments,
wt = h(ut) =
(
U − φt (wt, s0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
wt = h(ut) =
(
U − φt (wt, s0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
.
Thus, at every period of the game, P must offer to A the following expected payments,
wt =
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
(13)
wt =
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
. (14)
Using (13) and (14) P ’s Expected Cost function ECs0t , Expected Revenue function ERs0t
and Expected Profit function EΠs0t are calculated for every t as follows,
ECt = αt ·
(
θ0wt + (1− θ0)wt
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1wt + (1− θ1)wt
)
+ Ct(s0) (15)
ERt = αt ·
(
θ0Rt + (1− θ0) ·Rt
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1Rt + (1− θ1)Rt
)
+ Ct(s0) (16)
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EΠt = ERt − ECt (17)
Let us use the superscript s0 ∈ {0, S} in ECs0t and ws0t to differentiate the expected cost
function and expected payments when P invests in motivational capital s0 = S from the
no investment case s0 = 0. We then write conditional to s0 ∈ {0, S} two Expected Cost
functions, two Expected Revenue functions and two Expected Profit functions.
EC0t = αt ·
(
θ0wt + (1− θ0)wt
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1wt + (1− θ1)wt
)
(18)
ECSt = αt ·
(
θ0wt + (1− θ0)wt
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1wt + (1− θ1)wt
)
+ Ct(S) (19)
ER0t = αt ·
(
θ0Rt + (1− θ0)Rt
)
+ (1− αt) ·
(
θ1Rt + (1− θ1)Rt
)
(20)
ERSt = αt ·
(
θ0Rt + (1− θ0)Rt
)
+ (1− αt) ·
(
θ1Rt + (1− θ1)Rt
)
+ Ct(S) (21)
EΠ0t = ER
0
t − EC0t = αt ·
(
θ0
(
Rt − wt
)
+ (1− θ0) (Rt − wt)
)
+ (1− αt)
(
θ1
(
Rt − wt
)
+ (1− θ1) (Rt − wt)
)
(22)
EΠSt = ER
S
t − ECSt = αt ·
(
θ0
(
Rt − wt
)
+ (1− θ0) (Rt − wt)
)
+ (1− αt) ·
(
θ1
(
Rt − wt
)
+ (1− θ1) (Rt − wt)
)
− Ct(S) (23)
As we have said in Section II, doctors’ intrinsic motivation can be considered another
productive asset or capital of the health organization called Motivational Capital. The
current net value (CNV mk) of the return of an investment in motivational capital is:
CNV mk =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
(24)
in which, δt =
(
1/(1+r)
)t is the discount factor, and r is the discount rate. We say that
the principal has incentives to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk > 0 and we say
that, there is no incentive to invest in motivational capital when CNV mk < 0.
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3 Results
We solve the principal’s problem under two alternative scenarios: when P chooses s0 = S
and when he chooses s0 = 0. We calculate the solution for each case to show necessary and
sufficient conditions for investing in motivational capital.
3.1 Motivational Incentives: Crowding In
First, we solve the model for the case in which the health manager chooses s0 = S. In this
case, A’s spot utilities and spot payments in each t are:
uSt = U − φt (wt, S) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ (25)
uSt = U − φt (wt, S)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ (26)
wSt =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, S] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
(27)
wSt =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, S]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
. (28)
Using (25) and (26) we calculate A’s expected utility Et[USt |θi, φt] for every period t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , T . We differentiate two cases, Ah or when agents have an intrinsic motivation
above the average φht > φt on the one hand, and Al or when agents who have an intrinsic
motivation below the average φhl < φt on the other hand.
EUS,ht = Et[US,ht |θ1, φht ] =
(
θ1u
S
t + (1− θ1)uSt
)
−Ψ + φhkt (wt, S) (29)
EUS,lt = Et[US,lt |θ0, φlt] =
(
θ0u
S
t + (1− θ0)uSt
)
+ φ
lj
t (wt, S) (30)
Where φhit (wt, S) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of k-est agent whose intrinsinc
motivation is above the average and φljt (wt, S) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of j-est
agent whose intrinsinc motivation is below the average.
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Finally, using (23), (29) and (30), we calculate the current value of the sum of all periods
expected profits (ΓS), the sum of the all periods expected utilities (ΛS) and the current value
of the total surplus (TSS) when the action of P is s0 = S.
ΓS =
T∑
t=0
δtEΠSt
ΛS =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt · EUS,lt + (1− αt) · EUS,ht
]
TSS = ΛS + ΓS (31)
3.2 Motivational Incentives: Crowding Out
The second case is s0 = 0, when P uses pure monetary rewards and causes the crowding
out of intrinsic motivation. In this case, A’s spot utilities and spot payments in each t are:
u0t = U − φt (wt, 0) +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ (32)
u0t = U − φt (wt, 0)−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ (33)
w0t =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, 0] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
(34)
w0t =
(
U − Et[φt|wt, 0]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)−1
. (35)
Using (32) and (33) we calculate A’s expected utility Et[U0t |θi, φt] for every period t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , T . We differentiate two cases, Ah or when agents have an intrinsic motivation
above the average φht > φt on the one hand, and Al or when agents who have an intrinsic
motivation below the average φhl < φt on the other hand.
EU0,ht = Et[U0,ht |θ1, φht ] =
(
θ1u
0
t + (1− θ1)u0t
)
−Ψ + φhkt (wt, 0) (36)
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EU0,lt = Et[U0,lt |θ0, φlt] =
(
θ0u
0
t + (1− θ0)u0t
)
+ φ
lj
t (wt, 0) (37)
Where φhkt (wt, 0) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of k-est agent whose intrinsinc
motivation is above the average and φljt (wt, 0) is the amount of intrinsic motivation of j-est
agent whose intrinsinc motivation is below the average.
Finally, using (22), (36) and (37), we calculate the current value of the sum of all periods
expected profits (ΓS), the sum of the all periods expected utilities (Λ0) and the current value
of the total surplus (TS0) when the action of P is s0 = 0.
Γ0 =
T∑
t=0
δtEΠ0t
Λ0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt · EU0,lt + (1− αt) · EU0,ht
]
TS0 = Λ0 + Γ0 (38)
3.3 Comparative Statics
A health manager who is considering to invest in doctors motivation anticipates that to
benefit from this, even in the long run, the additional profits of having intrinsically motivated
agents must overcome the addtional costs of motivate them somewhere in time.
Our model shows that an intrinsically motivated doctor is willing to work for lower
overall pay. Thus P ’s benefits will be increasing when he decides to motivate doctors
s0 = S and decreasing when he decides not to motivate doctors. Therefore, motivational
capital profitability requires that the following condition holds once the crowding effects
have entirely happened.
w0t − wSt + θ1(∆w0 −∆wS) > γS (39)
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Changes in each parameter of the model will affect the profitability of such the investment
onMotivational Capital. Then to study how these parameters affects the benefits of investing
in motivation will be a key question to find the conditions under which a health manager
may benefit from motivational capital. in the nexte sections we analyze different cases.
Motivational Capital and Optimal Contracts
We want to establish a decision rule for P . He will take an action over s0 = {0, S} depending
upon the total present profit that he can extract from each. Our analysis of P ’s behaviour
then begins with a comparison of the different values of the contracts that he gets in with
each decision. Let T be the number of periods that the game is going to be played. We
then have:
ΓS − Γ0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
Looking at the above expression, the decision rule for P will be to choose s0 = 0 (pure
monetary reward incentives) when ΠS − Π0 < 0 and to choose s0 = S when ΠS − Π0 > 0.
As we can see, the above expression equals the expression (24), which reflects the current
net value of an investment made by P to generate motivation CNV mk. P will then choose
s0 = S in the case that CNV mk > 0 and will choose s0 = 0 in the case that CNV mk 6 0.
We then establish the following result:
Proposition 1. Let T be the number of periods that the game will be played. Let L0 < T and
LS < T be the minimun number of time periods enough to allow crowding effects entirely
happen for s0 = 0 and s0 = S respectively. If
[
w0t − wSt + θ1(∆w0 −∆wS)
]
> γS with
∆w0t = w
0
t − w0t and ∆wSt = wSt − wSt , then there exists a threshold t∗ such that:
CNV mk = ΓS − Γ0 =
t∗∑
t=0
δt
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
= 0
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and for which
i. If t∗ < T then CNV mk > 0 and P finds it profitable to invest in motivational capital
and choose the s0 = S strategy.
ii. If t∗ > T then CNV mk 6 0 and P finds it profitable to not invest in motivational
capital and chooses the s0 = 0 strategy.
Figure 3 illustrates the result using a particular case. The left side shows P ’s expected
profit functions for s0 = 0 and s0 = S. The right side shows the value of the CNV mk as a
function of time t. The t∗ threshold determines the critical point which determnes the best
strategy for P .
Fig. 3: Current Net Value of Motivational Capital. The graph shows together the
expected profit functions EΠSt and EΠ0t , joint with the current net value of motivational
capital CNV mk. In t0 and tS the crowding effects ofb s0 = 0 and s0 = S are completed. The
motivational investments profitability threshold t∗ shows the point at which the CNV mk
becomes positive and therefore investing in motivational capital s0 = S is the best choice
for P
CNV mk depends on P ’s time preference, which is captured in the model by the param-
eter δ. Lower values indicate that the health manager puts more weight on the present.
Impatience therefore makes s0 = S less attractive.
Remark. A lower value of δ means that the health manager is more focused on the short
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term. This implies that t∗ will be larger, consequently making any investment of resources
in motivational capital (i.e., implementing the s0 = S strategy) less attractive to him.
This simple observation leads to an important discussion: the need for politically in-
dependent managerial positions in health. The political cycle forces politicians and conse-
quently managers in health, to set short-term goals. They have a low δ because they put
a lot of weight in the profits earned during the legislature. In contrast, doctors are career
professionals who have long- term goals in health provision. As a result, politicians usually
prefer to implement control and command policies and monetary incentives rather than
implementing motivational incentives or investing in motivational capital (both of which
are initially costly).
Depreciation Cost and Motivational Capital
A high depreciation cost γ may make investments in motivational capital no optimal at all.
Proposition 2. Let t0 < T and tS < T be the minimun number of periods enough to allow
crowding effects entirely happen for s0 = 0 and s0 = S respectively. Then, taking S as
constant, if γ > [w
0
t−wSt +θ1(∆w0−∆wS)]
S
, then CNV mk < 0 for all t = 1, 2, ... and P never will
find profitable to invest in motivational capital.
Proposition 2 states that when the depreciation cost is a higher fraction of the initial
invested amount in motivational capital than the fraction that expected additional profits
are over the same invested amount, then health manager never will invest in motivational
capital because he will not expect any profit from this, neither in the short nor in the long
run.
Risk Aversion and Motivational Capital
In the model, agents are risk-averse and thereby receive contingent rewards linked to per-
formance qt. As A’s intrinsic motivation increases, fewer incentives and less variation in
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payments are required in order to encourage him to exert high effort. Less variation in pay-
ments indicates that A can be compensated with a lower risk premium, and this constitutes
another cost-saving source for the health organization.
Proposition 3 formally states that investing in motivational capital is more profitable in
the presence of risk-averse A:
Proposition 3. Investing in motivational capital is more profitable for P in presence of
risk-averse agents. Let A1 and A2 be a pair of agents with φ1 and φ2 intrinsic motivation
respectively. If the agents are risk-averse and φ1 < φ2, then the risk premium will be lower
in the case of A2 than in the case of A1. This additional advantage in costs shortens t∗ and
consequently CNV mkt will earlier become positive.
The intuition behind this result is that incentives must be greater in order to encourage
high effort from agents without much intrinsic motivation. However, these higher incentives
raise the range between the low w and the high w payments. Given that A is risk averse,
the risk premium that P should offer to make the incentive contract attractive for A will
be higher. Analogously, intrinsically motivated agents required fewer incentives to exert
high effort. Consequently, she has to bear a lower variance over payments and has to be
compensated with a lower risk premium.
Doctors’ Outside Options and Motivational Capital
When doctors have less options to employ out of the organization then, intuitively, we may
expect that investments in motivational capital would become less attractive for the health
manager. This is so because with less outside options (U = 0), the low incentive payment
ws0t required to incentivize doctors’ effort is equal to 0 due to limited liability constraint (8).
Proposition 4. Investments in motivational capital will be less likely to be optimal to the
principal (health manager) when U = 0 and no outside options are available to agents
(doctors).
22
Proposition 4 states that in contexts with no outside options or with less likely ones,
incentivize high effort from doctors is less costly. Then, health managers will find less
attractive to invest in motivational capital and they will be more focused in using only
monetary incentives.
Fig. 4: Information and intrinsic motivation. Four different curves appear in the
figure. h(ut,φ1) and h(ut,φ1) show incentives for every value of θ0 when the agent has φ1
intrinsic motivation. h(ut,φ2) and h(ut,φ2) show incentives for every value of θ0 when the
agent has φ2 intrinsic motivation. In the figure we represent the case in which φ2 > φ1.
Information and Motivational Capital
Information affects motivational capital. Higher values of θ0, or closer to θ1 may change the
conditions under which investing in motivational capital is optimal. We study how a poor
correlation between effort and performance affects the decision of investing in motivational
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capital.
Higher values of θ0 increase incentive payments in expected terms. This is so, by twofold
reason: first because a poorer (more random) signal of doctors’ effort increases doctors’ rent
extraction power and, second, because doctors are risk averse. In this context a reduction
in incentive payments coming from having more intrinsically motivated doctors, result in a
higher expected savings. Therefore, as mean as performance becomes more random signal
of effort, the profitability of investing in motivational increase.
Proposition 5. Whenever the LLC condition is applied, higher values of θ0, more close to
θ1 entail higher values of CNV mk.
Figure 4 illustrates proposition 5. The figure show how incentives respond to an incre-
ment on θ0. As it can be seen in the figure, an increment of the same amount on θ0 (∆θ0),
generates an increment in incentive payment of lower magnitude when the agent is more
intrinsically motivated (∆wt,φ1 > ∆wt,φ2). Then, investing in motivational capital is more
profitable in cases in which performance is a more random signal of the agent’s effort.
4 Conclusion
The following conclusions summarize the results of this work.
Results show that in the long run, to dedicate resources to crowd in doctors intrinsic
motivation, although costly at inception, will result more efficient than the use of monetary
incentives. However, if health care managers are focused on the short run (legislative period),
then they will have a tendency to choose purely monetary rewards.
A health manager considering to invest or not in motivation will compute the present
value of the expected returns of both alternatives. As long as health manager will have a
lower discount factor more weight will put in the short run and less attractive will find to
invest in doctors’ motivation. This, strengthen the previous conclusion.
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In the model investments in motivational capital entails depreciation costs. If the cost of
depreciation is so large that the benefit from doctors intrinsic motivation can not compensate
it, then an investment in doctors’ motivation will not be optimal at all for health manager.
Doctors outside options affect positively to the optimality of making investments in
motivational capital. Then, in public health, investments in motivational capital will be
more attractive in those medical specialties which have better outside options in the private
sector.
When doctors are risk-averse, investments in motivational capital are more likely to be
profitable for the health manager. When doctors are intrinsically motivated they are paid
with lower uncertainty to exert high effort and this result in a benefit for the health manager.
Whenever doctors own a large amount of private information or performance is a poor
signal of effort and contexts in which doctors’ private information is higher make more
investments in motivational capital more profitable.This case is particularly interesting be-
cause in health, outcomes are hard to measure and often the factors which determine them
are not only doctors’ effort. Furthermore, physicians are highly qualified professionals in
areas of advanced and complex knowledge. As a consequence, they own a large amount
of private information. Our results predict that health organizations are excellent candi-
dates to benefit from motivational capital investments due to the informational features
that characterize them.
Finally, other parameters and elements present in the model can offer information to
determine when motivational investments will be optimal for health manager. The total
surplus of contracts depend on the doctors’ intrinsic motivation distribution function. The
form of this distribution and how the crowding effects affect it, are crucial to determine the
effects produced by incentives −economic or motivational− on the total welfare of all the
members of the health organization. This is a field to explore in depth that we consider for
further research.
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A Mathematical Appendix
Stochastic Dominance
Crowding effects move the distribution of doctors intrinsic motivation with a stochastic
dominance. Then for any fixed value of φt = φ∗ we have,
Ft(φt = φ
∗|wt, 0) > Ft−1(φt−1 = φ∗|wt−1, 0) > · · · > F0(φ0)
> · · · > Ft−1(φt−1 = φ∗|wt−1, S) > Ft(φt = φ∗|wt, S)
Assume that Ft(φ1|wt, S) converges to the upper bound of intrinsic motivation φt = Φ and
that Ft(φ1|wt, 0) converges to the lower bound of intrinsic motivation φt = 0.
lim
t→∞
Ft(φt|wt, S) = ρ in which ρ =
{
1 if φt = Φ
0 otherwise
and
lim
t→∞
Ft(φt|wt, 0) = 1, for every φt ∈ [0,Φ].
Let Et[φ|s0, wt] be the mathematical expectation in t of the value of φt given the incentive
policy s0 and incentives wt. Consequently, stochastic dominance on Et[φt|·] assumes:
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, 0] < Et[φt|wt, 0]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et+1[φt+1|wt+1, S] > Et[φt|wt, S]
∀t = 0, 1, ..., T, ... Et[φt|wt, 0] < Et[φt|wt, S]
In which:
Et[φt|wt, s0] =
∫ Φ
0
φtf(φt|wt, s0)dφt
Proof of Proposition 1
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We have to study the sign of the following expression:
ΓS − Γ0 =
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt ·
(
θ0
(
Rt − wSt
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
Rt − wSt
) )
+(1− αt) ·
(
θ1
(
Rt − wSt
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt − wSt
) )]
−
T∑
t=0
δt
[
αt
(
θ0
(
Rt − w0t
)
+ (1− θ0)
(
Rt − w0t
) )
+(1− αt)
(
θ1
(
Rt − w0t
)
+ (1− θ1)
(
Rt − w0t
) )]− T∑
t=0
δtCt(S)
We have to show that there is a given threshold t∗ ∈ t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . . such that,
ΓS − Γ0 = 0
Crowding effects, stochastic dominance, and (39) imply that for all tˆ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T, . . . }
such that tˆ > t0 and tˆ > tS, the following condition holds,
EΠStˆ − EΠ0tˆ > 0
As we know in t = 0,
EΠS0 − EΠ00 < 0
Then there exists a t¯ such that 0 < t¯ < tˆ in which,
EΠSt¯ = EΠ
0
t¯ (40)
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and then,
t¯∑
t=0
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
< 0 (41)
T∑
t=t¯
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
> 0 (42)
where (41) results in a negative and finitely bounded value and (42) is unbounded and only
finds its limit when the game ends. Formally,
t¯∑
t=0
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
= −M (43)
lim
t→∞
∞∑
t=t¯
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
=∞ (44)
From (40) and (44) we now that there exists a t∗ ∈ {t¯+ 1, . . . , T, . . . } such that,
t∗∑
t=t¯
[
EΠSt − EΠ0t
]
= M
And therefore the following holds,
ΓS − Γ0 = 0
Proof of Proposition 2
Immediate. The analogous case of proposition 1. Proof available from the authors upon
request.
Proof of Proposition 3
Using (13), (14) and h(u) : u −→ w we have that incentive payments are,
wt = h
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0] +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
(45)
wt = h
(
U − E[φt|wt, s0]−
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
. (46)
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From (45) and (46) we now that for any pair of expected values of intrinsic motivation
φ1, φ2 ∈ φ(wt, s0) such that φ1 > φ2 we have that,
w1t = h
(
U − φ1 +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
< h
(
U − φ2 +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
= w2t (47)
w1t = h
(
U − φ1 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
< h
(
U − φ2 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
= w2t . (48)
Assume first that agents are risk neutral to set a benchmark case. That is to say that
ut(wt) = wt. Then P will pay lower incentives to the higher motivated A,
w1t − w2t = φ2 − φ1
w1t − w2t = φ2 − φ1 if w1t > 0 and w2t > 0
w1t − w2t = η where η = U − φ2 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ if w1t = 0 and w
2
t > 0
w1t − w2t = 0 if w1t = 0 and w2t = 0
In the model agents are risk-averse, h′ > 0 and h′′ > 0. Then for the cases above we have
that,
h
(
U − φ1 +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
− h
(
U − φ2 +
(
(1− θ0)/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
> φ2 − φ1
h
(
U − φ1 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
− h
(
U − φ2 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
> φ2 − φ1 if w1t > 0 and w2t > 0
h
(
U − φ2 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ
)
> U − φ2 −
(
θ0/∆θ
)
Ψ if w1t > 0 and w
2
t = 0
0 if w1t = 0 and w
2
t = 0
and then, the costs saved by P because As are intrinsically motivated are higher when
agents are risk averse and therefore CNV mkt will earlier reach a positive value.
Proof of Proposition 4
Setting U = 0 we have that w1t = 0 and w2t = 0.
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From now on we proof the proposition 4 in two steps.
i.-
[
w0t −wSt + θ1(∆w0−∆wS)
]
>
[
θ1(∆w
0−∆wS)
]
and condition (39) becomes harder
to hold than in the case of U > 0 and having a CNV mk < 0 for all t = 1, 2, ... is more
likely.
ii.- For the case in which (39) holds, reasoning as in the proof of proposition 3, it is
straightforward to see that w0t − wSt is the unique source of savings for P and in any
case will be lower (as much equal if LLC applies) than in the case of U > 0. So thus,
CNV mkt will become positive earlier when U > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
By (13) and (14) we know that,
ut = U − φt (wt, s0) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
·Ψ
ut = U − φt (wt, s0)−
θ0
∆θ
·Ψ.
Applying function h(u) = w in order to calculate payments we have that,
wt = h
(
U − φt (wt, s0) + (1− θ0)
∆θ
·Ψ
)
(49)
wt = h
(
U − φt (wt, s0)− θ0
∆θ
·Ψ
)
. (50)
Differentiating (49) and (50) with respect to θ0 we have,
∂wt
∂θ0
= h′(ut) · (1− θ1)
(θ1 − θ0)2 Ψ > 0 (51)
∂wt
∂θ0
= −h′(ut) ·
θ1
(θ1 − θ0)2 Ψ < 0. (52)
and then higher θ0 implies higher wt and lower wt. Differentiating (51) and (52) with respect
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to φt we have that,
∂2wt
∂θ0∂φt
= −h′′(ut) · (1− θ1)
(θ1 − θ0)2 Ψ < 0 (53)
∂2wt
∂θ0∂φt
= h′′(ut) ·
θ1
(θ1 − θ0)2 Ψ > 0 (54)
Interpreting the signs of (51) and (53) we have that, as mean as higher is A’s intrinsic moti-
vation, an increase of same magnitude in θ0 provokes an increase in wt of lower magnitude.
From the signs of (52) and (54) we interpret that as mean as higher is A’s intrinsic motiva-
tion, an increase of equal magnitude in θ0 provokes an decrease in wt of lower magnitude.
Let θLLC0 ∈ (0, θ1) be the minimun value of θ0 such that LLC is applied. Then we have
that,
∂wt
∂θ0
∣∣∣
θ0>θLLC0
= 0
This establishes that, for higher values of θ0 the benefits from choosing s0 = S come only
from the lower impact the higher θ0 has on wt when agents intrinsic motivation is higher.
Thus, with θ0 more close to θ1 more intrinsically motivated agents imply higher values of
CNV mkt for every t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T, . . .
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